Derive Security From Risk

Derive Security From Risk

Turns a ratified business driver or functional requirement — together with a named threat — into a Security Requirement (SR) the gate can verify. This skill does NOT propose generic controls and does NOT parent SRs to unspecified parent risks; every SR names the obligation or threat it satisfies.

When to Use

• A BR-* or FR-* exists for the engagement and processes regulated data, money, identity, or controlled access.
• A threat modelling session (STRIDE, LINDDUN, attack tree) has produced a concrete threat the architecture must mitigate.
• A compliance obligation (PCI, HIPAA, APRA CPS 234, GDPR, ISO 27001 Annex A) maps to a control the design must enforce.
• NOT when nobody can name the threat yet — run a threat-modelling session first; do not derive a control to look productive.

Prerequisites

• The parent BR-* or FR-* exists in requirements/<engagement>/ and is ratified.
• A named threat or obligation is recorded in requirements/<engagement>/threats/<threat-id>.md (free-form, but the SR body must cite it).
• spec/artifact-schema.md is the contract for SR frontmatter.

If no named threat exists, stop. The TOGAF red thread breaks the moment a control mitigates a threat nobody named.

How to Run

bashCopy code
bash scripts/verify-traceability.sh requirements/<engagement>
# create requirements/<engagement>/SR/SR-NNN.md
bash scripts/verify-traceability.sh requirements/<engagement>

Quick Reference

Example SR frontmatter:

yamlCopy code
---
id: SR-003
layer: SR
title: PII masking before persistence
parent_ids: [BR-001, FR-002]
owner: security.lead@example.com
measurable: true
ratified_by: ""
target: "Zero unmasked PII fields in storage; verified by daily DLP scan."
derivation_skill: derive-security-from-risk
tags: [pii, masking, data-protection, threat-T03]
---

Procedure

Step 1: Assess

• Read the parent artifact with view. Confirm the data classification (public / internal / confidential / regulated) is stated.
• Read the threat record. Confirm it names a threat actor, a target asset, and a damaging outcome. A "threat" of "users might do something bad" is not a threat — stop.

Step 2: Derive

For each named threat or obligation, produce one SR with:

• A control statement that names what the system MUST or MUST NOT do (RFC 2119 register, not prose).
• A measurable target: a scan, a metric, an audit query, an attestation cadence. If the control cannot be measured the gate rejects it.
• A traceable obligation: cite the threat ID or the regulation clause in the body. The agent never invents the obligation — it cites one.

Step 3: Link

• parent_ids includes the affected BR-* and/or FR-*. SRs MAY also parent to an NFR-* when the control constrains an existing quality attribute (e.g. an availability SR for a fraud-detection service).
• derivation_skill: derive-security-from-risk is mandatory.

Step 4: Confirm

bashCopy code
bash scripts/verify-traceability.sh requirements/<engagement>

Must exit 0. Then regenerate the RTM:

bashCopy code
bash scripts/gen-rtm.sh requirements/<engagement>

Pitfalls

• DO NOT emit a generic "encrypt everything" SR with no threat cited. Generic controls produce generic audits and miss the actual risk.
• DO NOT parent an SR to a threat record directly — the threat is the justification (cited in the body); the parent is always a ratified requirement.
• DO NOT mark measurable: true without defining how it is measured. The gate cannot tell, but the auditor can.
• DO NOT ratify the SR from the agent. The Security Architect (or a human approver) sets ratified_by after review.
• DO NOT write an SR that mitigates a threat without an owner. An unowned control is an unowned control failure six months from now.

Verification

• SR-*.md filename equals its id.
• parent_ids resolves to ratified BR-*/FR-*/NFR-*.
• Body cites a named threat ID or a specific regulatory clause.
• target describes how the control is measured.
• bash scripts/verify-traceability.sh requirements/<engagement> exits 0.
• bash scripts/verify.sh passes the full gate.