Context
Spawned agents have read access to the entire repository, including .env files containing live credentials. If an agent reads secrets and writes them to .squad/ files (decisions, logs, history), Scribe auto-commits them to git, exposing them in remote history. This skill codifies absolute prohibitions and safe alternatives.
Patterns
Prohibited File Reads
NEVER read these files:
.env(production secrets).env.local(local dev secrets).env.production(production environment).env.development(development environment).env.staging(staging environment).env.test(test environment with real credentials)- Any file matching
.env.*UNLESS explicitly allowed (see below)
Allowed alternatives:
.env.example(safe — contains placeholder values, no real secrets).env.sample(safe — documentation template).env.template(safe — schema/structure reference)
If you need config info:
- Ask the user directly — "What's the database connection string?"
- Read
.env.example— shows structure without exposing secrets - Read documentation — check
README.md,docs/, config guides
NEVER assume you can "just peek at .env to understand the schema." Use .env.example or ask.
Prohibited Output Patterns
NEVER write these to .squad/ files:
| Pattern Type | Examples | Regex Pattern (for scanning) |
|---|---|---|
| API Keys | OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-proj-..., GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_... | `[A-Z_]+(?:KEY |
| Passwords | DB_PASSWORD=super_secret_123, password: "..." | `(?:PASSWORD |
| Connection Strings | postgres://user:pass@host:5432/db, Server=...;Password=... | `(?:postgres |
| JWT Tokens | eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9... | eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+ |
| Private Keys | -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----, -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | -----BEGIN [A-Z ]+PRIVATE KEY----- |
| AWS Credentials | AKIA..., aws_secret_access_key=... | `AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} |
| Email Addresses | user@example.com (PII violation per team decision) | [a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,} |
What to write instead:
- Placeholder values:
DATABASE_URL=<set in .env> - Redacted references:
API key configured (see .env.example) - Architecture notes: "App uses JWT auth — token stored in session"
- Schema documentation: "Requires OPENAI_API_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN (see .env.example for format)"
Scribe Pre-Commit Validation
Before committing .squad/ changes, Scribe MUST:
-
Scan all staged files for secret patterns (use regex table above)
-
Check for prohibited file names (don't commit
.enveven if manually staged) -
If secrets detected:
- STOP the commit (do NOT proceed)
- Remove the file from staging:
git reset HEAD <file> - Report to user:
🚨 SECRET DETECTED — commit blocked File: .squad/decisions/inbox/river-db-config.md Pattern: DATABASE_URL=postgres://user:password@localhost:5432/prod This file contains credentials and MUST NOT be committed. Please remove the secret, replace with placeholder, and try again. - Exit with error (never silently skip)
-
If no secrets detected:
- Proceed with commit as normal
Implementation note for Scribe:
- Run validation AFTER staging files, BEFORE calling
git commit - Use PowerShell
Select-Stringorgit diff --cachedto scan staged content - Fail loud — secret leaks are unacceptable, blocking the commit is correct behavior
Remediation — If a Secret Was Already Committed
If you discover a secret in git history:
- STOP immediately — do not make more commits
- Alert the user:
🚨 CREDENTIAL LEAK DETECTED A secret was found in git history: Commit: abc1234 File: .squad/decisions/inbox/agent-config.md Pattern: API_KEY=sk-proj-... This requires immediate remediation: 1. Revoke the exposed credential (regenerate API key, rotate password) 2. Remove from git history (git filter-repo or BFG) 3. Force-push the cleaned history Do NOT proceed with new work until this is resolved. - Do NOT attempt to fix it yourself — secret removal requires specialized tools
- Wait for user confirmation before resuming work
Examples
✓ Correct: Reading Config Schema
Agent needs to know what environment variables are required:
Agent: "What environment variables does this app need?" → Reads `.env.example`: OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-... DATABASE_URL=postgres://user:pass@localhost:5432/db REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379 → Writes to .squad/decisions/inbox/river-env-setup.md: "App requires three environment variables: - OPENAI_API_KEY (OpenAI API key, format: sk-...) - DATABASE_URL (Postgres connection string) - REDIS_URL (Redis connection string) See .env.example for full schema."
✗ Incorrect: Reading Live Credentials
Agent needs to know database schema:
Agent: (reads .env) DATABASE_URL=postgres://admin:super_secret_pw@prod.example.com:5432/appdb → Writes to .squad/decisions/inbox/river-db-schema.md: "Database connection: postgres://admin:super_secret_pw@prod.example.com:5432/appdb" 🚨 VIOLATION: Live credential written to committed file
Correct approach:
Agent: (reads .env.example OR asks user) User: "It's a Postgres database, schema is in migrations/" → Writes to .squad/decisions/inbox/river-db-schema.md: "Database: Postgres (connection configured in .env). Schema defined in db/migrations/."
✓ Correct: Scribe Pre-Commit Validation
Scribe is about to commit:
powershell# Stage files git add .squad/ # Scan staged content for secrets $stagedContent = git diff --cached $secretPatterns = @( '[A-Z_]+(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET)=[^\s]+', '(?:PASSWORD|PASS|PWD)[:=]\s*["'']?[^\s"'']+', 'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+' ) $detected = $false foreach ($pattern in $secretPatterns) { if ($stagedContent -match $pattern) { $detected = $true Write-Host "🚨 SECRET DETECTED: $($matches[0])" break } } if ($detected) { # Remove from staging, report, exit git reset HEAD .squad/ Write-Error "Commit blocked — secret detected in staged files" exit 1 } # Safe to commit git commit -F $msgFile
Anti-Patterns
- ❌ Reading
.env"just to check the schema" — use.env.exampleinstead - ❌ Writing "sanitized" connection strings that still contain credentials
- ❌ Assuming "it's just a dev environment" makes secrets safe to commit
- ❌ Committing first, scanning later — validation MUST happen before commit
- ❌ Silently skipping secret detection — fail loud, never silent
- ❌ Trusting agents to "know better" — enforce at multiple layers (prompt, hook, architecture)
- ❌ Writing secrets to "temporary" files in
.squad/— Scribe commits ALL.squad/changes - ❌ Extracting "just the host" from a connection string — still leaks infrastructure topology


