Hunt Lateral Movement

Lateral Movement Hunt Skill (PsExec/WMI)

Proactively hunt for signs of lateral movement using common administrative tools like PsExec or WMI abuse.

Inputs

• TIME_FRAME_HOURS - Lookback period (default: 72)
• (Optional) TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY - UDM query to narrow scope
• (Optional) HUNT_HYPOTHESIS - Reason for the hunt
• (Optional) HUNT_CASE_ID - SOAR case for tracking

Workflow

Step 1: Research Techniques

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secops-mcp.get_threat_intel(query="MITRE T1021.002 SMB Admin Shares")
secops-mcp.get_threat_intel(query="MITRE T1047 WMI")
secops-mcp.get_threat_intel(query="MITRE T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer")

Step 2: Develop Hunt Queries

Query Placeholders

The queries below use placeholders that must be customized for your environment:

PsExec Service Installation:

udmCopy code
metadata.product_event_type = "ServiceInstalled" AND
target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "PSEXESVC.exe"

PsExec Execution (services.exe spawning unusual processes):

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metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe" AND
target.process.file.full_path NOT IN @known_services  // Replace with your Chronicle reference list

WMI Process Creation:

udmCopy code
metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
principal.process.file.full_path = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\WmiPrvSE.exe" AND
target.process.file.full_path IN ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")

WMI Remote Execution:

udmCopy code
metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "wmic" AND
principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "/node:" AND
principal.process.command_line CONTAINS "process call create"

PowerShell WMI Methods:

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metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH" AND
target.process.file.full_path CONTAINS "powershell.exe" AND
(target.process.command_line CONTAINS "Invoke-WmiMethod" OR
 target.process.command_line CONTAINS "Invoke-CimMethod")

Combine with TARGET_SCOPE_QUERY if provided.

Step 3: Execute SIEM Searches

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secops-mcp.search_security_events(text=query, hours_back=TIME_FRAME_HOURS)

Run each developed query.

Step 4: Network Correlation

If suspicious process activity found, correlate with network:

udmCopy code
metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_CONNECTION" AND
target.port = 445 AND
target.ip = "TARGET_IP" AND      // Replace with actual target IP from findings
principal.ip = "SOURCE_IP"       // Replace with actual source IP from findings

Look for SMB connections temporally correlated with remote execution.

Step 5: Analyze Results

Look for anomalous patterns:

• PsExec/WMI from unexpected sources (user workstations vs. admin servers)
• Execution targeting many hosts rapidly
• Suspicious commands executed via WMI
• Temporal correlation between network connections and remote process execution

Step 6: Enrich Findings

If suspicious activity found:

For each suspicious entity (host, user):

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secops-mcp.lookup_entity(entity_value=ENTITY)

For any discovered IOCs: Use /enrich-ioc

Step 7: Check Related Cases

Use /find-relevant-case with suspicious entities.

Step 8: Document & Conclude

Use /document-in-case:

• Hunt hypothesis
• Techniques hunted (T1021.002, T1047, etc.)
• Queries used (with results)
• Negative results explicitly noted
• Suspicious findings with enrichment
• Suggested follow-on actions

If lateral movement confirmed: → Trigger case_event_timeline_and_process_analysis for affected processes → Trigger compromised_user_account_response for involved users → Escalate to incident response

Required Outputs

After completing this skill, you MUST report these outputs:

Key Indicators