Django web applications
The single authoritative skill for building, reviewing, securing, testing and shipping a Django app — the batteries-included, ORM-first, request/response Python framework.
Mental model: a Django project is apps composed of fat-but-thin-enough models (domain + query logic on the model/manager), views that orchestrate (FBV/CBV/DRF) and never own SQL, an admin/forms layer, and a settings module split by environment. The ORM, migrations, auth, admin, CSP and the test runner are all first-party. Reach for the framework before you add a dependency.
Pinned stack (2026-06)
- Django 5.2 LTS — the production default. Released 2025-04-02, security fixes until
~April 2028, supports Python 3.10–3.14. New in 5.2: all models auto-imported in
shell,CompositePrimaryKey,BoundFieldcustomization. - Django 6.0 — released 2025-12-03 (non-LTS, ~8 months until 6.1). Choose it only when you
want the new built-in Tasks framework (background jobs without Celery) or native CSP
(
ContentSecurityPolicyMiddleware,SECURE_CSP) and can take the shorter support window. Drops Python 3.10/3.11; supports 3.12–3.14. - Django REST Framework 3.17.1 (2026-03-24) — adds Django 6.0 + Python 3.14 support.
- Python 3.12+,
pytest-django,factory_boy. ruff/uv and type-hint policy live inpython.
Version rule: default to 5.2 LTS. Pick 6.0 only for a concrete Tasks/CSP need, and say so.
Route elsewhere
| Situation | Route to |
|---|---|
Async service, fastapi/pydantic/uvicorn, async SQLAlchemy | fastapi |
| Postgres schema design, EXPLAIN ANALYZE, indexing strategy, RLS, pooling | postgresdb |
| Cross-stack OWASP/STRIDE threat modeling | secure-coding |
| Container/Compose/CI, gunicorn prod tuning, collectstatic pipeline | deployment |
| REST contract design (cursor vs offset, status codes, versioning) | api-design |
| ruff/uv/general type hints, packaging | python |
Project shape
Split settings by environment; never ship one settings.py toggled by DEBUG.
textsrc/ manage.py config/ settings/ base.py # shared; reads secrets from os.environ dev.py # from base import *; DEBUG=True; local hosts prod.py # from base import *; DEBUG=False; SECURE_*; CSP catalog/ # an app = a bounded domain models.py managers.py views.py serializers.py urls.py admin.py migrations/ tests/
- Read secrets with
os.environ["SECRET_KEY"](ordjango-environ). Never commit a literalSECRET_KEY— a leaked key forges sessions and signed tokens. - Select env via
DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE=config.settings.prod, not anif DEBUGbranch. - One app = one domain. Resist a single
coreapp that accretes everything.
Models
Put domain and query logic on the model and its manager. The view stays thin.
python# managers.py from django.db import models class ArticleQuerySet(models.QuerySet): def published(self): return self.filter(status=Article.Status.PUBLISHED) def for_reader(self): # composes; reused everywhere, tested once return self.published().select_related("author") # models.py class Article(models.Model): class Status(models.TextChoices): DRAFT = "draft", "Draft" PUBLISHED = "published", "Published" tenant = models.ForeignKey("Tenant", on_delete=models.CASCADE) slug = models.SlugField() author = models.ForeignKey("Author", on_delete=models.PROTECT) status = models.CharField(max_length=16, choices=Status.choices, default=Status.DRAFT) published_at = models.DateTimeField(null=True, blank=True) objects = ArticleQuerySet.as_manager() class Meta: constraints = [ models.UniqueConstraint(fields=["tenant", "slug"], name="uniq_tenant_slug"), models.CheckConstraint( check=models.Q(status="draft") | models.Q(published_at__isnull=False), name="published_needs_date", ), ] indexes = [models.Index(fields=["tenant", "status"])]
- Constraints live in the DB, not just Python. A
UniqueConstraint/CheckConstraintis enforced under concurrency; aclean()check is not. Validate-in-Python-only is a foot-gun. on_deleteis mandatory and load-bearing:CASCADEdeletes children,PROTECTblocks the delete,SET_NULLorphans. Choosing wrong silently destroys data — pick deliberately.- Multi-column PK (5.2+):
pk = models.CompositePrimaryKey("tenant_id", "id"). - Bad→Good for business logic:
python# Bad: logic in the view — untested, unreusable, duplicated across endpoints def publish(request, pk): a = Article.objects.get(pk=pk) a.status = "published"; a.published_at = timezone.now(); a.save() # Good: a method on the model — one place, testable, reused by view/admin/command class Article(models.Model): def publish(self): self.status = self.Status.PUBLISHED self.published_at = timezone.now() self.save(update_fields=["status", "published_at"])
QuerySet performance
The N+1 is the single most common Django defect: one query for the list, then one more per row.
python# Bad: 1 + N queries — each .author touches the DB inside the loop for a in Article.objects.all(): print(a.author.name) # Good: 2 queries total (FK -> JOIN; reverse/M2M -> second query) for a in Article.objects.select_related("author").prefetch_related("tags"): print(a.author.name, [t.name for t in a.tags.all()])
| You are following | Use | Cost |
|---|---|---|
Forward ForeignKey / OneToOne | select_related(...) | SQL JOIN, 1 query |
Reverse FK, ManyToMany | prefetch_related(...) | 2nd query, joined in Python |
| Prefetch that itself needs filter/order | Prefetch("x", queryset=...) | controlled 2nd query |
- Need existence, not rows?
qs.exists(), neverlen(qs)orif qs.count(). - Need a few columns of a wide row?
.only("id", "slug")/.defer("body"). - Computed totals belong in the DB:
annotate(...)/aggregate(...), not a Python loop. - Many inserts:
bulk_create(objs)— one round-trip, not N.save()calls. - Never
Model.objects.all()then slice/filter in Python; push it into the QuerySet.
Deeper recipes (assertNumQueries, Prefetch, .explain(), ORM indexing) →
references/orm-performance.md.
Views & URLs
Keep views thin: validate input, call a model/manager method, return a response. No SQL.
| Need | Use |
|---|---|
| One bespoke action, custom flow | function-based view (FBV) |
| Standard list/detail/create/update/delete on a model | generic CBV (ListView, DetailView, …) |
| JSON API consumed by a client/SPA | drop to DRF (do not hand-roll JsonResponse CRUD) |
For the DRF surface — serializers, ModelViewSet, routers, permissions, throttling,
pagination, filtering, nested-serializer N+1, versioning — see
references/drf.md. The thin-view rule still holds: a fat serializer that
walks relations per row is just an N+1 wearing a tie.
Migrations
bashpython manage.py makemigrations catalog # generate from model diff python manage.py migrate # apply python manage.py makemigrations --check # CI gate: fail if a model drifts from migrations
- Never edit a migration that has been applied anywhere. Add a new one. Editing rewrites history and breaks every environment that already ran it.
- Data backfills go through
migrations.RunPython(forward, reverse)with a reverse, not a one-off script. Use the historical model fromapps.get_model(...), not the imported class. - Schema changes on a live table that you cannot afford to lock are expand-and-contract; the
Postgres-side mechanics (lock modes, batching) live in
postgresdb.
Security
Set these in prod.py. Then prove it: python manage.py check --deploy must come back clean.
| Setting | Value | Why |
|---|---|---|
DEBUG | False | True leaks settings + a stack-trace shell to the world |
ALLOWED_HOSTS | explicit domains | ['*'] enables Host-header attacks |
SECRET_KEY | from os.environ | a literal in source forges signed cookies/tokens |
SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT | True | force HTTPS |
SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS | 31536000 (+ include-subdomains, preload) | the check --deploy warning you saw is this being 0 |
SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE / CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE | True | stop cookie leak over HTTP |
SECURE_CSP (Django 6.0) | a real policy + nonce | native CSP; pre-6.0 use django-csp |
- CSRF protection is on by default — keep
CsrfViewMiddleware; do not blanket-exempt views. - The ORM parameterizes queries. Only
.raw(),.extra()andcursor.execute()with an f-string/%-built string reopen SQL injection. Pass params, never interpolate.
Full SECURE_* checklist, CSP nonce/report-only, upload/SSRF, ORM-injection →
references/security.md.
Testing
pythonimport pytest from rest_framework.test import APIClient @pytest.mark.django_db def test_owner_only(article, owner): client = APIClient() assert client.get(f"/api/articles/{article.pk}/").status_code == 403 # anon client.force_authenticate(owner) assert client.get(f"/api/articles/{article.pk}/").status_code == 200
pytest-django+@pytest.mark.django_db; run with--reuse-dbto skip rebuilds locally.TestCasewraps each test in a rolled-back transaction (fast). UseTransactionTestCaseonly when you teston_commithooks or real commit behavior.- Lock in N+1 fixes with
assertNumQueries(2)— it fails the build when a relation regresses. - Build instances with
factory_boy, not 30 lines ofModel.objects.create(...).
Setup, fixtures, transactional DB, coverage → references/testing.md.
Background work
| Need | Use |
|---|---|
| New project on Django 6.0, simple enqueue-and-forget jobs | the built-in Tasks framework |
| Pre-6.0, or you need schedules/retries/fan-out/result backends/workers at scale | Celery |
Either way: enqueue from the model/service layer, never block the request thread.
Anti-patterns
| Anti-pattern | Why it bites | Do instead |
|---|---|---|
| Business logic in the view | untested, duplicated across endpoints | method on the model/manager |
f-string SQL into .raw()/.extra()/cursor.execute | SQL injection | parameterized queries |
Looping rows touching .author | N+1 queries | select_related/prefetch_related |
DEBUG=True in prod | leaks settings + stack traces | DEBUG=False in prod.py |
SECRET_KEY literal in source | forged sessions/tokens | os.environ |
Validation only in clean() | races under concurrency | DB UniqueConstraint/CheckConstraint |
Model.objects.all() in a template loop | one query per iteration | prefetch in the view |
ModelViewSet with no permission_classes | endpoint open to the world | explicit permission class |
| Fat serializer walking relations | N+1 per response | prefetch + assertNumQueries |
| Editing an applied migration | breaks every env that ran it | new migration |
len(qs) / qs.count() to test existence | full fetch/COUNT | qs.exists() |
Swallowing Model.DoesNotExist silently | hidden bugs | get_object_or_404 or handle explicitly |
Verify
scripts/verify.sh [TARGET] greps tracked Django source for high-signal foot-guns:
FAIL on a literal SECRET_KEY, ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*'], or f-string SQL in
.raw()/.extra()/cursor.execute; WARN on DEBUG = True outside a dev settings file and
a ModelViewSet/APIView with no permission_classes. Read-only, exit 0 on a clean or empty
target. It is a lint, not a substitute for manage.py check --deploy or the test suite.


