Sast Entry Mapper

CONTEXT: Authorized security research. Analyzing source code for vulnerability entry points.

Task

Read the assigned source file and identify every point where data from outside the process enters. This is a reading comprehension task — list what you see, do not speculate about vulnerabilities.

What Counts as an Entry Point

Direct external input

• Network: recv(), read() on sockets, HTTP handler params, RPC arguments
• File: fread(), read() on file descriptors, config parsing, media decoding
• IPC: shared memory reads, pipe reads, D-Bus message handlers, signal handlers
• User: scanf(), getenv(), command-line args (argv), GUI input callbacks
• Hardware: ioctl() handlers, device register reads, DMA buffer access

Indirect external input

• Function parameters where callers pass external data (trace one level up)
• Struct fields populated by callers with external data
• Global/static buffers filled elsewhere from external sources
• Callback functions invoked with external data

Language-specific

• Rust: unsafe block reading from raw pointer, FFI function args, std::io::Read

• Java: HttpServletRequest params, ObjectInputStream.readObject(), JNDI lookups

• Python: request.args, sys.stdin, pickle.loads() input, eval() input

• Go: http.Request fields, io.Reader implementations, CGo pointer args

• PHP — ALL of these are tainted by default:

  • Superglobals: $_GET, $_POST, $_REQUEST, $_COOKIE, $_FILES, $_SERVER (note: $_SERVER['HTTP_*'] and $_SERVER['PHP_SELF']/QUERY_STRING/REQUEST_URI are attacker-controlled; $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] is semi-trusted)
  • Raw body: file_get_contents('php://input'), fopen('php://input'), $HTTP_RAW_POST_DATA
  • Session: $_SESSION[...] — tainted if any prior request wrote user input into it (second-order)
  • Env: $_ENV[...], getenv(...) — tainted in web contexts if set from request headers
  • Framework request objects (treat as direct input):
    • Laravel: $request->input(), $request->get(), $request->all(), $request->only(), $request->query(), $request->json(), $request->header(), $request->cookie(), $request->file(), request()->..., route parameters ($id in Route::get('/u/{id}', fn($id)=>...))
    • Symfony: $request->get(), $request->query->get(), $request->request->get(), $request->headers->get(), $request->files->get(), ParamConverter bound entities
    • CodeIgniter: $this->input->get(), $this->input->post(), $this->input->cookie(), $this->input->server()
    • WordPress: $_REQUEST in admin-ajax.php handlers, $_POST in wp_ajax_* callbacks, shortcode/hook callback args
    • Drupal: \Drupal::request()->query->get(), Drupal::request()->request->get(), form state values
    • Yii: Yii::$app->request->get(), $this->request->post()
  • Database-sourced taint (second-order): Any SELECT that returns data originally written from a superglobal (stored XSS/SQLi). Mark as indirect and name the write-path function if visible.
  • File upload metadata: $_FILES['x']['name'] (attacker-chosen filename — never trust extension from this), $_FILES['x']['type'] (client-provided MIME — forgeable), $_FILES['x']['tmp_name'] (trusted), $_FILES['x']['size'] (trusted)
  • Deserialization surface: Any call to unserialize(...) or any endpoint accepting a phar:// URL in any file op is an entry point for POP-chain attacks — track classes with __wakeup/__destruct/__toString/__call.

  PHP note on "trusted" values: nothing from the client is trusted. $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] is attacker-controlled unless a reverse proxy strips it. $_SERVER['SERVER_NAME'] depends on UseCanonicalName in Apache. When in doubt, mark as tainted.

For Each Entry Point, Record

1. Function name and line number
2. Data source: network / file / IPC / user / hardware / indirect
3. Data type: raw bytes / string / struct / integer / mixed
4. Size: fixed / bounded (by what?) / unbounded / unknown
5. Immediate validation: what checks happen in the SAME function before the data is used further? Be specific: "length checked against MAX_BUF (128) at line 52" not just "length checked"
6. Where it goes: what functions/operations receive this data next?

Output

Write to sast-work/<file_hash>-entries.json:

jsonCopy code
{
  "file": "src/net/tcp_input.c",
  "entry_points": [
    {
      "function": "tcp_do_segment",
      "line": 234,
      "source": "network",
      "data_type": "raw bytes (TCP segment)",
      "size": "bounded by IP packet size (65535) but length field is attacker-controlled",
      "validation": [
        "line 240: th->th_off checked >= 5 (minimum TCP header)",
        "line 245: total length vs IP length consistency check"
      ],
      "flows_to": ["tcp_sack_option_process(line 312)", "tcp_reass(line 458)"]
    }
  ]
}

Rules

• Only record what you can see in the code. Do not speculate about what callers might pass.
• For indirect entry points (function params), note "indirect — caller passes external data" and name the caller if visible.
• If you're unsure whether something is an entry point, include it with a note. False positives are cheap; missed entries are expensive.
• Do NOT analyze whether anything is vulnerable. That's not your job. Just map the entries.

Brain Integration

Check brain for prior analysis of this file. Skip if already mapped and file unchanged.

Top-Tier Operator Standard

Entry mapping should maximize recall without inventing attacker control.

• Classify entries by trust source: HTTP, CLI, file, archive, parser callback, network packet, env var, database row, queue message, webhook, plugin, template, test harness, or public API.
• Record the path from external input to function parameter when visible.
• Mark privilege and preconditions: auth required, admin only, local-only, feature flag, config option, or test-only.
• Include indirect entries with caller evidence; exclude pure internal helpers unless a caller imports external data.
• Do not assess vulnerability. Your output is the source inventory for flow tracing.