Cloud Security

Q: Why use Cloud Security on TypingMind?

Because you install it once and use it with any model. Cloud Security is plain Markdown rather than provider-specific code, so the same skill runs on GPT-5, Claude, Gemini, Grok, or a local model — and you can switch model mid-chat without it breaking. TypingMind runs on your own API keys, so you pay providers directly instead of a per-seat subscription, and your skills and chats stay in your own storage.

Q: How do I install Cloud Security in TypingMind?

Open Plugins → Skills → Install from GitHub in TypingMind and paste https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/tree/main/skills/cloud-security. TypingMind reads its SKILL.md and bundles its files and installs it as a skill you can enable per chat.

Q: Which AI models can use Cloud Security?

Any model you connect in TypingMind. AI skills are plain Markdown instructions rather than provider-specific code, so GPT, Claude, Gemini, Grok, and local models can all load this skill when a request matches it.

Q: How many AI models can I use with Cloud Security?

As many as you like. As long as a model supports skills, you can use Cloud Security with it — GPT, Claude, Gemini, Grok, DeepSeek, Mistral, Llama and more — all on TypingMind with your own API keys.

Q: Is the Cloud Security AI skill free?

Yes. It is published on GitHub by hypnguyen1209 under the MIT license. You only pay your own AI provider for the tokens you use.

Q: What are AI skills?

An AI skill is a reusable instruction bundle that teaches an AI model how to do one specific task. It follows the open Agent Skills format: a SKILL.md file with a name and description, plus any scripts, templates or reference files the model may need. The model reads the instructions only when your request matches the skill, so an installed skill costs nothing until it is used.

Q: How are AI skills different from plugins or MCP servers?

A plugin or MCP server gives a model new tools to call — code that runs somewhere and returns a result. An AI skill gives the model knowledge and process instead: how to approach a task, which steps to follow, what good output looks like. Skills are plain Markdown, so they need no server, no API key and no runtime, and they work with any model.

Community

hypnguyen1209

cloud-security

Use when attacking AWS/Azure/GCP cloud — IAM/identity privilege escalation, IMDS/metadata SSRF, Entra device-code & PRT theft, GCP impersonation chains, Kubernetes/container escape, IaC/CI-CD federation abuse

Overview

Publisher	hypnguyen1209
Repository	`offensive-claude`
Skill name	`cloud-security`
Stars	396
Forks	71
Bundled files	12
License	MIT
Links	Skill source Repository

Markdown instructions
A SKILL.md file the model loads on demand, so it only costs tokens when a request actually matches.
Works with any LLM
AI skills are plain Markdown, not provider-specific code, so this works with GPT, Claude, Gemini, Grok, or a local model.
12 bundled files
Scripts, templates, and references the model can read while it works. Files are read-only and never executed.
Open source
Published by hypnguyen1209 on GitHub. Read the source before you install it.

Installation

Install the Cloud Security AI skill in TypingMind to use it with any LLM, or drop it into another agent that reads SKILL.md.

Install in TypingMind

TypingMind installs a skill straight from its GitHub folder — it reads SKILL.md, bundles the resource files, and stores the result locally.

Open the app and go to Plugins → Skills.
Choose "Install from GitHub".
Paste the skill folder URL below and confirm.
https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/tree/main/skills/cloud-security
Enable the skill in any chat where you want it available.

Plugins → Skills → Add skill → From GitHub URL, then paste the folder URL and press Continue.

Install in another agent

Any agent that reads the Agent Skills format can use this skill — copy the folder into that agent's skills directory.

Claude Code — .claude/skills

git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude.git /tmp/offensive-claude
mkdir -p .claude/skills
cp -r /tmp/offensive-claude/skills/cloud-security .claude/skills/cloud-security

Restart Claude Code after copying so it picks up the new skill.

Use it in TypingMind

Enable Cloud Security in any TypingMind chat and the model takes it from there. Its name and description sit in the system prompt, and the moment a request matches, the model loads the full instructions itself — you never invoke it by hand, and it costs no tokens until it is actually used.

The model loads Cloud Security on its own as soon as a request matches it.

Works with any AI model

AI skills are plain Markdown instructions rather than provider-specific code, so Cloud Security is not tied to the model it was written for. Install it once in TypingMind and use it with GPT-5, Claude, Gemini, Grok, DeepSeek, Mistral, Llama, or a local model you run yourself — all on your own API keys.

Loaded only when it is needed
The system prompt carries just the name and description. The instructions are fetched on the first matching request, so an idle skill costs nothing.
Switch models mid-chat
Because the skill is instructions rather than code, changing model does not break it — the next model reads the same SKILL.md.

Skill instructions

This is the SKILL.md content the model loads. Read it before installing — a skill is instructions your model will follow.

Cloud Security & Attack

When to Activate

Cloud penetration test / red team against AWS, Azure (Entra ID), or GCP
IAM / identity privilege escalation and cross-account or cross-tenant pivoting
Compromised web app or SSRF reachable from cloud compute — harvest metadata credentials
Kubernetes / container assessment, node breakout, cluster takeover
CI/CD and IaC review: Terraform state, OIDC federation trust policies, pipeline secrets
Post-exploitation: secret extraction, lateral movement, persistence in cloud control plane

Technique Map

Technique	ATT&CK	CWE	Reference	Script
AWS IAM privesc (CreatePolicyVersion, PassRole, AttachPolicy)	T1098.001	CWE-269	references/aws-iam-privesc.md	scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py
AWS `sts:AssumeRoot` member-account escalation	T1078.004	CWE-269	references/aws-iam-privesc.md	scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py
Cross-account confused deputy / missing ExternalId	T1078.004	CWE-441	references/aws-iam-privesc.md	scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py
IMDS / metadata SSRF credential theft (AWS/Azure/GCP)	T1552.005	CWE-918	references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md	scripts/imds_harvester.py
EKS node creds → IRSA / Pod Identity pivot	T1552.007	CWE-668	references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md	scripts/imds_harvester.py
Entra device-code phishing → PRT / device join	T1528	CWE-287	references/azure-entra-attacks.md	scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py
FOCI refresh-token family abuse	T1550.001	CWE-613	references/azure-entra-attacks.md	scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py
Azure Managed Identity / App-Admin → SP escalation	T1098.001	CWE-269	references/azure-entra-attacks.md	scripts/imds_harvester.py
GCP `actAs` + resource create impersonation chain	T1078.004	CWE-269	references/gcp-attacks.md	scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py
GCP `serviceAccountTokenCreator` token chains	T1528	CWE-269	references/gcp-attacks.md	scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py
Vertex AI P4SA / Ray head-node escalation	T1078.004	CWE-732	references/gcp-attacks.md	scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py
Container escape (runc Leaky Vessels CVE-2024-21626)	T1611	CWE-668	references/kubernetes-container-escape.md	-
IngressNightmare (CVE-2025-1974) cluster takeover	T1190	CWE-94	references/kubernetes-container-escape.md	scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py
K8s RBAC privesc (pods/exec, token mount, node proxy)	T1078	CWE-269	references/kubernetes-container-escape.md	scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py
Terraform state secret extraction	T1552.001	CWE-312	references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md	scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py
OIDC federation trust-policy abuse (GitHub/TF Cloud)	T1199	CWE-441	references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md	scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py

Quick Start

bash
# --- 0. Identify where you are ---
aws sts get-caller-identity                       # AWS
az account show && az ad signed-in-user show      # Azure
gcloud auth list && gcloud config get-value project  # GCP

# --- 1. AWS: enumerate then map privesc paths ---
python3 scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py --profile compromised --json paths.json
cloudfox aws --profile compromised all-checks      # alt: broad inventory
pacu  # > run iam__enum_permissions ; run iam__privesc_scan

# --- 2. SSRF / metadata: harvest creds from a reachable compute target ---
python3 scripts/imds_harvester.py --ssrf "https://app/fetch?url=" --provider aws
python3 scripts/imds_harvester.py --local --provider azure --resource https://vault.azure.net/

# --- 3. Azure Entra: device-code phish for tokens (authorized phishing only) ---
python3 scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py --resource https://graph.microsoft.com \
    --client-id 29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e   # Auth Broker -> PRT path

# --- 4. GCP: build the service-account impersonation graph ---
python3 scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py --project TARGET --out gcp_graph.json

# --- 5. Kubernetes: what can this token do, and can we break out? ---
python3 scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py --kubeconfig ./kubeconfig
kubectl auth can-i --list ; peirates

# --- 6. CI/CD + IaC: audit federation trust + dump state secrets ---
python3 scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py --profile compromised
aws s3 cp s3://tf-state/prod/terraform.tfstate - | jq '.. | .password? // empty'

OPSEC & Detection (summary)

Technique	Telemetry / IOC	Detection (Sigma / EDR / cloud)	OPSEC note
IAM privesc API calls	CloudTrail `CreatePolicyVersion`, `AttachUserPolicy`, `CreateLoginProfile`	Alert on IAM write by non-IAM-admin principal; GuardDuty `PrivilegeEscalation:IAMUser/*`	Use existing admin sessions; avoid bulk enum that trips anomaly detection
`sts:AssumeRoot`	CloudTrail `AssumeRoot` (regional only)	Elastic "AssumeRoot by Rare User and Member Account" (new-terms rule)	Rare-event detection fires on first use per (principal, member account)
IMDS SSRF	VPC flow to 169.254.169.254 from web tier; STS use from new ASN	GuardDuty `UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration*` (creds used off-instance)	Use creds from same egress IP where possible; creds expire — refresh fast
Entra device-code phish	Sign-in logs `authenticationProtocol=deviceCode`; Auth Broker client `29d9ed98-...`; new device registration	Sentinel device-code anomaly; CA "block device code flow"	Tokens valid even after password reset; device-join = MFA-resistant persistence
GCP impersonation	`GenerateAccessToken` / `generateAccessToken` in Admin Activity + Data Access logs	Alert on impersonation by principal lacking a documented chain	Requires Data Access (`DATA_READ`) audit logs enabled to see token minting
Container escape (runc)	New process from `/proc/self/fd/*` cwd; host binary writes; `nsenter` in container	Falco `Container escape`/`Drop and execute new binary`; runc ≤1.1.11 inventory	Overwrites host runc → noisy; prefer read-only host FS read for stealth
IngressNightmare	NGINX ingress pod loads `.so` from `/proc`; outbound from controller	Falco/Sysdig "IngressNightmare" shared-lib load; ingress-nginx < 1.11.5/1.12.1	Exploit hits admission webhook (often internal-only) — low external noise
OIDC trust abuse	CloudTrail `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` from unexpected `sub`/repo	Alert on web-identity assume with mismatched `aud`/`sub`; RCP block	Wildcard `sub` (`org:foo*`) still exploitable; no creds needed

Deep Dives

references/aws-iam-privesc.md — Classic + 2024 IAM escalation chains, sts:AssumeRoot, cross-account confused deputy / ExternalId, Cognito, secrets harvesting; detection per API.
references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md — IMDSv1/v2 mechanics, SSRF bypasses, Azure & GCP metadata token theft, EKS node-cred → IRSA/Pod Identity lateral movement.
references/azure-entra-attacks.md — Storm-2372 device-code → PRT → device-join chain, FOCI token families, Managed Identity abuse, Application Administrator → service principal → Global Admin.
references/gcp-attacks.md — actAs + resource-create impersonation, serviceAccountTokenCreator chains, Cloud Functions takeover, Vertex AI ModeLeak/P4SA/Ray escalation.
references/kubernetes-container-escape.md — runc Leaky Vessels (CVE-2024-21626), privileged/hostPID/Docker-socket escapes, IngressNightmare (CVE-2025-1974), RBAC primitives, kubelet/etcd.
references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md — Terraform state secret extraction, OIDC federation trust-policy abuse (GitHub Actions / Terraform Cloud), pipeline secret theft, RCP/SCP defenses.

Bundled files

The model reads these on demand while the skill is loaded. They are exposed as readable files and are never executed.

Frequently asked questions

What does the Cloud Security AI skill do?

Why use Cloud Security on TypingMind?

Because you install it once and use it with any model. Cloud Security is plain Markdown rather than provider-specific code, so the same skill runs on GPT-5, Claude, Gemini, Grok, or a local model — and you can switch model mid-chat without it breaking. TypingMind runs on your own API keys, so you pay providers directly instead of a per-seat subscription, and your skills and chats stay in your own storage.

How do I install Cloud Security in TypingMind?

Open Plugins → Skills → Install from GitHub in TypingMind and paste https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/tree/main/skills/cloud-security. TypingMind reads its SKILL.md and bundles its files and installs it as a skill you can enable per chat.

Which AI models can use Cloud Security?

Any model you connect in TypingMind. AI skills are plain Markdown instructions rather than provider-specific code, so GPT, Claude, Gemini, Grok, and local models can all load this skill when a request matches it.

How many AI models can I use with Cloud Security?

As many as you like. As long as a model supports skills, you can use Cloud Security with it — GPT, Claude, Gemini, Grok, DeepSeek, Mistral, Llama and more — all on TypingMind with your own API keys.

Is the Cloud Security AI skill free?

Yes. It is published on GitHub by hypnguyen1209 under the MIT license. You only pay your own AI provider for the tokens you use.

What are AI skills?

An AI skill is a reusable instruction bundle that teaches an AI model how to do one specific task. It follows the open Agent Skills format: a SKILL.md file with a name and description, plus any scripts, templates or reference files the model may need. The model reads the instructions only when your request matches the skill, so an installed skill costs nothing until it is used.

How are AI skills different from plugins or MCP servers?

A plugin or MCP server gives a model new tools to call — code that runs somewhere and returns a result. An AI skill gives the model knowledge and process instead: how to approach a task, which steps to follow, what good output looks like. Skills are plain Markdown, so they need no server, no API key and no runtime, and they work with any model.

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Overview

Installation

Install in TypingMind

Install in another agent

Use it in TypingMind

Works with any AI model

Skill instructions

Cloud Security & Attack

When to Activate

Technique Map

Quick Start

OPSEC & Detection (summary)

Deep Dives

Bundled files

Frequently asked questions

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