De-identifying clinical text
openmed.deidentify detects PHI/PII and rewrites the text so it can be shared,
stored, or analyzed without exposing patients. It runs fully on-device after
a one-time model download — no network calls, no telemetry, no raw PHI leaving
the process. This is the single most important OpenMed entry point for privacy
work; everything else (policies, audit, multilingual, date-shifting) layers on
top of it.
When to use this skill
Reach for deidentify when you need to transform text — replace, mask, remove,
hash, or date-shift the identifiers. If you only need to locate PHI spans
without changing the text, use extract_pii (see extracting-pii-entities). To
restore masked text later, use reidentify (see reidentifying-text).
Quick start
pythonimport openmed note = ( "Patient John Doe (MRN 1234567) was seen on 2024-03-02 by Dr. Alice Reed. " "Contact: john.doe@example.com, 617-555-0142." ) result = openmed.deidentify( note, method="mask", # mask | remove | replace | hash | shift_dates confidence_threshold=0.7, # safety default; raise to reduce false negatives' impact policy="hipaa_safe_harbor", # optional bundled profile (see below) ) print(result.deidentified_text) # Patient [NAME] (MRN [ID_NUM]) was seen on [DATE] by Dr. [NAME]. ... for e in result.pii_entities: # NEVER log e.text / e.original_text — those are raw PHI. Use offsets + label. print(e.canonical_label, e.start, e.end, round(e.confidence, 3))
deidentify returns a DeidentificationResult with these fields (note the
exact names):
| Field | What it holds |
|---|---|
.deidentified_text | the rewritten, PHI-safe string (your output) |
.pii_entities | list[PIIEntity] — each has start, end, canonical_label, confidence, action, surrogate; original_text/text hold raw PHI |
.mapping | redacted→original dict, only when keep_mapping=True (secret) |
.method | the method actually applied |
.metadata | run metadata (model, policy, counts) |
The five methods
method= | Effect | Reversible? | Use when |
|---|---|---|---|
"mask" | John Doe → [NAME] | with keep_mapping=True | default; clear that redaction happened |
"remove" | deletes the span entirely | no | minimal-footprint output |
"replace" | type-matched fake value (John Doe→Mark Lee) | with keep_mapping=True | keep notes readable/parseable (see generating-synthetic-surrogates) |
"hash" | stable hash per value, links repeats | no (one-way) | cohort linkage without revealing identity |
"shift_dates" | moves dates, preserves intervals | n/a | research needing temporal structure (see shifting-clinical-dates) |
Workflow
- Pick a method and a policy. Start from a bundled
policy=profile (hipaa_safe_harbor,gdpr_pseudonymization,research_limited_dataset, …) so per-label actions are set for you. Seeconfiguring-privacy-policies. - Set
confidence_thresholddeliberately. Default is0.7. For de-id, prefer over-redaction: a missed identifier is a breach, an over-redacted token is just noise. The bundled safety sweep catches structured IDs (SSN, MRN-like, emails) even below threshold. - Run
deidentify. Inspectresult.pii_entitiesby offset and label, not raw text, to confirm coverage. - For stable surrogates, pass
consistent=True, seed=<int>so the same input maps to the same fake value every run (reproducible pipelines). - For reversibility, pass
keep_mapping=Trueand storeresult.mappingin a secured vault — never alongside the de-identified output. - Verify, don't assume. Check residual risk with
audit=True(auditing-deidentification-runs) and the 18-identifier checklist (auditing-safe-harbor-checklist).
Consistent surrogates and reversibility
python# Same fake identity for every mention of the same person, reproducibly: r = openmed.deidentify(note, method="replace", consistent=True, seed=42) # Reversible de-id (keep the mapping secret and separate from output): r = openmed.deidentify(note, method="mask", keep_mapping=True) restored = openmed.reidentify(r.deidentified_text, r.mapping) assert restored == note
Hand-off to / from OpenMed
- Detect only:
openmed.extract_pii(text)→PredictionResultwith.entities(spans, no rewrite). Use it to preview coverage first. - Restore:
openmed.reidentify(deidentified_text, mapping)— requireskeep_mapping=Trueat de-id time and proper authorization. - Policies:
configuring-privacy-policiesto choose/customize apolicy=. - Audit:
deidentify(..., audit=True)→AuditReportwith offsets, hashes, detector provenance, and residual-risk — never plaintext. - Other surfaces (same engine): MCP tool
openmed_deidentify; RESTPOST /pii/deidentify. There is no CLI de-id command.
Edge cases & gotchas
- Attribute names. It is
result.deidentified_textandresult.pii_entities— not.text/.entities. (extract_piireturns aPredictionResultwhose spans are at.entities.) - Raw PHI never leaves the span objects.
PIIEntity.textand.original_textcontain real identifiers. Do not print, log, or cache them. Audit and logs use offsets,canonical_label, and hashes only. - Threshold is a safety dial, not an accuracy dial. Lowering it redacts more; in de-id, false positives are cheap and false negatives are breaches.
shift_datesis for dates only; combine withkeep_year/date_shift_days(seeshifting-clinical-dates). It does not touch names or IDs.keep_mappingoutput is sensitive as PHI. The mapping re-identifies everyone — store it encrypted, access-controlled, and apart from the output.- Multilingual: pass
lang=(andlocale=for surrogates) for non-English notes; seedeidentifying-multilingual-text. Do not run English models on other languages. - De-id is verified, not assumed. Gate releases on leakage/residual-risk, not F1 alone.
Standards & references
- HIPAA De-identification, 45 CFR 164.514(b) — Safe Harbor & Expert Determination: https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html
- HHS Safe Harbor 18-identifier guidance: see
auditing-safe-harbor-checklist. - OpenMed source:
openmed/core/pii.py(deidentify,extract_pii,reidentify,DeidentificationResult,PIIEntity).

