Aws Github Oidc Scoped Role

AWS GitHub Actions OIDC — Scoped IAM Role

OIDC Provider Setup

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data "tls_certificate" "github_oidc" {
  url = "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
}

resource "aws_iam_openid_connect_provider" "github" {
  url             = "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
  client_id_list  = ["sts.amazonaws.com"]
  thumbprint_list = [data.tls_certificate.github_oidc.certificates[0].sha1_fingerprint]
}

One provider per AWS account. If it already exists, use a data source instead.

Scope: sub (repo+branch) vs job_workflow_ref (specific workflow file)

Most tutorials scope the OIDC trust to a repo+branch using the sub claim:

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# Minimal scope — any workflow in the repo on main can assume this role
condition {
  test     = "StringLike"
  variable = "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub"
  values   = ["repo:ORG/REPO:ref:refs/heads/main"]
}

For privileged roles (e.g., AI agents, deploy roles), scope to a specific workflow file using job_workflow_ref. This prevents any new workflow added to the repo from assuming the role:

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# Tight scope — only the specific workflow file from main can assume this role
condition {
  test     = "StringLike"
  variable = "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub"
  values   = ["repo:ORG/REPO:*"]  # AWS requires sub to be non-empty; use wildcard here
}
condition {
  test     = "StringEquals"
  variable = "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:job_workflow_ref"
  values   = ["ORG/REPO/.github/workflows/my-workflow.yml@refs/heads/main"]
}

The aud condition is always required:

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condition {
  test     = "StringEquals"
  variable = "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud"
  values   = ["sts.amazonaws.com"]
}

AI Agent Role Pattern (ReadOnlyAccess + Bedrock + Deny overrides)

For an AI triage/analysis role that can read AWS resources and invoke Bedrock models:

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resource "aws_iam_role" "ai_agent" {
  name               = "myapp-ai-agent"
  assume_role_policy = data.aws_iam_policy_document.ai_agent_assume.json
}

# Broad read access to inspect infrastructure
resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "ai_agent_readonly" {
  role       = aws_iam_role.ai_agent.name
  policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/ReadOnlyAccess"
}

# Bedrock model invocation
resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "ai_agent_bedrock" {
  name = "bedrock-invoke"
  role = aws_iam_role.ai_agent.id
  policy = jsonencode({
    Version = "2012-10-17"
    Statement = [
      {
        Effect = "Allow"
        Action = [
          "bedrock:InvokeModel",
          "bedrock:InvokeModelWithResponseStream",
          "bedrock:Converse",
          "bedrock:ConverseStream",
        ]
        Resource = [
          # Direct foundation model ARNs
          "arn:aws:bedrock:*::foundation-model/anthropic.*",
          # Cross-region inference profiles (jp.anthropic.*, us.anthropic.*, global.anthropic.*, etc.)
          "arn:aws:bedrock:*:*:inference-profile/*anthropic.*",
        ]
      },
      # Anthropic models on Bedrock are AWS Marketplace SaaS products.
      # Even when already subscribed at the account level, the *assuming role*
      # must have Marketplace view/subscribe permissions or Bedrock returns
      # AccessDenied regardless of the subscription status.
      {
        Effect = "Allow"
        Action = [
          "aws-marketplace:ViewSubscriptions",
          "aws-marketplace:Subscribe",
        ]
        Resource = "*"
      },
    ]
  })
}

# ReadOnlyAccess includes secretsmanager:GetSecretValue and kms:Decrypt.
# Deny these explicitly so the agent cannot read secrets or tfstate.
resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "ai_agent_deny" {
  name = "deny-sensitive-reads"
  role = aws_iam_role.ai_agent.id
  policy = jsonencode({
    Version = "2012-10-17"
    Statement = [
      {
        Effect   = "Deny"
        Action   = ["secretsmanager:GetSecretValue", "kms:Decrypt"]
        Resource = "*"
      },
      {
        Effect   = "Deny"
        Action   = ["s3:GetObject"]
        Resource = [
          "arn:aws:s3:::${var.tfstate_bucket}",
          "arn:aws:s3:::${var.tfstate_bucket}/*",
        ]
      },
    ]
  })
}

GitHub Actions Workflow Side

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permissions:
  id-token: write   # required for OIDC token issuance
  contents: read

jobs:
  ai-triage:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v6
        with:
          role-to-assume: ${{ secrets.AWS_AI_AGENT_ROLE_ARN }}
          aws-region: ap-northeast-1
          role-session-name: ai-triage-${{ github.run_id }}

Common Pitfalls

• Missing aws-marketplace permissions with Bedrock: Even if the Bedrock subscription is active at the account level, the assumed role needs aws-marketplace:ViewSubscriptions (and sometimes Subscribe) or Bedrock API calls return AccessDenied. This is not mentioned in most Bedrock IAM documentation.

• Cross-region inference profile ARNs: Bedrock cross-region inference uses inference-profile resource type with region-prefixed model IDs (jp.anthropic.*, us.anthropic.*, global.anthropic.*). The standard foundation-model/anthropic.* ARN only covers same-region invocations. You need both ARNs.

• sub condition must not be empty: AWS OIDC validation requires at least one sub condition even when using job_workflow_ref. Use a wildcard (repo:ORG/REPO:*) as a fallback — the real scoping comes from job_workflow_ref.

• job_workflow_ref includes the full ref: the value is ORG/REPO/.github/workflows/FILE.yml@refs/heads/main — not just the file path. Omitting the @refs/heads/main suffix means any branch can trigger the assume.

• ReadOnlyAccess includes sensitive read actions: secretsmanager:GetSecretValue, kms:Decrypt, s3:GetObject are all included in ReadOnlyAccess. For agent roles that only need infrastructure inspection, add explicit Deny statements to prevent credential leakage.