Wp Cli Security

WP-CLI security

When to use this skill

Use this skill whenever code registers or implements a WP-CLI command:

• WP_CLI::add_command( 'my-plugin thing', ... ).
• Writing a command class method that reads $args / $assoc_args.
• Running destructive operations (delete, reset, import, purge) from the command line.
• Returning data or logging progress from a CLI routine.

WP-CLI runs as the system user, often as root on containers or with broad file-system permissions. It has no WordPress current user by default, so current_user_can() does not authorize CLI actions. Arguments are still untrusted input.

Related: see the capability-permission-checks skill for normal web-request authorization and the cron-background-job-security skill for scheduled jobs.

Core principles (and why they matter)

1. No current_user_can() in CLI by default. There is no logged-in WordPress user. Either use WP_CLI::launch_self() with a --user flag, explicitly set a user with --user, or perform capability-independent maintenance tasks only.
2. Sanitize every argument. $args and $assoc_args can come from scripts, CI, or shell history; treat them as untrusted input.
3. Use prepared statements for database access. Do not interpolate $args into $wpdb queries.
4. Confirm destructive actions. WP_CLI::confirm() stops accidental data loss in automated runs.
5. Never print secrets. API keys, tokens, and passwords must not appear in CLI output, logs, or shell history.
6. Be explicit about --allow-root. Running as root is common in containers but dangerous; document it and avoid file ownership surprises.

Step-by-step implementation

1. Register the command with WP_CLI::add_command() and a clear docblock.
2. In the command method, validate argument counts and sanitize each value to type.
3. For destructive commands, call WP_CLI::confirm() unless --yes is passed.
4. Use $wpdb->prepare() for any dynamic query.
5. Avoid echo; use WP_CLI::log(), WP_CLI::success(), or WP_CLI::error().
6. If the command needs a user context, require --user=<id|login|email> and load it with WP_User::get_data_by() / wp_set_current_user().

Supporting references

Common AI mistakes / anti-patterns

Mistake 1 — Interpolating $args into a query

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// ❌ Insecure: SQL injection via CLI argument.
$wpdb->query( "DELETE FROM {$wpdb->prefix}my_table WHERE id = {$args[0]}" );

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// ✅ Secure: use $wpdb->prepare().
$id = absint( $args[0] );
$wpdb->query( $wpdb->prepare( "DELETE FROM {$wpdb->prefix}my_table WHERE id = %d", $id ) );

Mistake 2 — Assuming an admin user context

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// ❌ Insecure: current_user_can is meaningless without --user.
if ( current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) {
    update_option( 'my_plugin_key', $value );
}

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// ✅ Secure: require --user or gate by filesystem/CLI policy, not web capability.
class My_Plugin_CLI_Command {
    /**
     * Update a setting.
     *
     * ## OPTIONS
     * [--user=<user>]
     * : User to run as.
     */
    public function update_setting( $args, $assoc_args ) {
        if ( isset( $assoc_args['user'] ) ) {
            $user = get_user_by( 'login', $assoc_args['user'] );
            if ( $user ) {
                wp_set_current_user( $user->ID );
            }
        }

        if ( ! current_user_can( 'manage_options' ) ) {
            WP_CLI::error( 'This command requires --user with manage_options capability.' );
        }

        update_option( 'my_plugin_key', sanitize_text_field( $args[0] ) );
        WP_CLI::success( 'Setting updated.' );
    }
}

Mistake 3 — Printing secrets in output

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// ❌ Insecure: secret is now in shell history and terminal scrollback.
WP_CLI::log( 'Using API key: ' . $api_key );

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// ✅ Secure: log an identifier or redacted value.
WP_CLI::log( 'Using API key ending in: ' . substr( $api_key, -4 ) );

Mistake 4 — Destructive command with no confirmation

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// ❌ Risky: a typo in CI wipes data.
public function purge( $args ) {
    $wpdb->query( "TRUNCATE {$wpdb->prefix}my_plugin_logs" );
}

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// ✅ Secure: require confirmation unless --yes is passed.
public function purge( $args, $assoc_args ) {
    if ( ! isset( $assoc_args['yes'] ) ) {
        WP_CLI::confirm( 'This will delete all logs. Are you sure?' );
    }
    global $wpdb;
    $wpdb->query( "TRUNCATE {$wpdb->prefix}my_plugin_logs" );
    WP_CLI::success( 'Logs purged.' );
}

Mistake 5 — Trusting associative args without defaults

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// ❌ Fragile: missing key causes undefined array warning.
$days = $assoc_args['days'];

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// ✅ Secure: provide defaults and sanitize.
$days = isset( $assoc_args['days'] ) ? absint( $assoc_args['days'] ) : 30;

Correct code examples

A complete secure WP-CLI command class is in references/secure-wp-cli-command.php.

Checklist

• Every CLI argument is sanitized to its expected type.
• Database queries use $wpdb->prepare(); no argument interpolation.
• Destructive commands call WP_CLI::confirm() unless --yes is provided.
• The command does not rely on current_user_can() without an explicit --user.
• Secrets, tokens, and API keys are never printed or logged in plaintext.
• --allow-root usage is documented and justified.
• Output uses WP_CLI::log() / success() / error() instead of echo.
• Command docblocks define options and examples.

Official references

• WP-CLI Commands — Handbook
• WP_CLI::add_command()
• WP_CLI::error()
• WP_CLI::success()
• WP_CLI::log()
• WP_CLI::confirm()
• Config — WP-CLI
• OWASP — Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet