Anon

confide:anon — local PII redaction

Redact personally identifying information from a transcript (or a whole folder) using the layered local stack in shared/confide_core.py: regex (emails / URLs / phones / IDs / dates) → Natasha (RU named entities) → local LLM (quasi-identifiers). Spans are interval-merged and replaced with placeholders. The result is a GREEN copy safe to review.

By default anon emits a reversible map: unique reserved-sentinel placeholders (the same EXACT value always becomes the same [CONFIDE_<TYPE>_<NNNN>], e.g. [CONFIDE_PERSON_0001], [CONFIDE_EMAIL_0001], [CONFIDE_DATE_0002]) plus a sibling <name>.map.json (structured: schema_version, doc_id, green_sha256, created, entries[]) mapping each placeholder to its original. The CONFIDE_ sentinel is reserved — a real transcript essentially never contains it, so there is no collision risk and rehydrate never touches ordinary prose like "Person 1". This is exact-value matching, not entity coreference: inflected forms (e.g. RU "Марина" vs "Марины") are SEPARATE placeholders (no lemmatized merge). That map is the secret — the ONLY artifact with originals; it stays local and enables confide:rehydrate to put real values back into a cloud analysis of the GREEN text (round-trip: redact → analyze the green → rehydrate locally). Use --no-map for the legacy non-reversible [TYPE] style (no map written).

Privacy invariants (do not violate)

• Local-only. No cloud APIs. Raw text never leaves the machine.
• By design, original PII is written ONLY to the local, 0600, gitignored <name>.map.json, which never leaves the machine. It is never printed, and never written to the GREEN copy (the GREEN holds placeholders only; the original file is read, never rewritten). The map is the SECRET — the one artifact with originals. A .gitignore covering *.map.json, *.view.html, and *.restored.md is written/updated in the output dir so these local-only artifacts can never be committed. If the output dir looks cloud-synced (iCloud / Dropbox / OneDrive / Google Drive), anon prints a WARNING that the secret map would be uploaded.
• Counts only. stdout and the *.stats.json files carry counts (by type, by layer, redaction rate) — never PII values or redacted text dumps.
• Human review still required. Redaction is a floor, not a guarantee. A human must read the GREEN copy before sharing. Pair with confide:red to check residual re-identification risk.

Run it

Run the script on a single file or a directory (processes every .md/.txt):

bashCopy code
python3 skills/anon/scripts/anon.py PATH

For each input it writes, next to the file (or into --out DIR):

• <name>.green.md — the redacted text (the only thing safe to look at / share after review)
• <name>.stats.json — counts only
• <name>.map.json — the reversible map (secret; 0600; gitignored; local only). Skipped with --no-map. A .gitignore with *.map.json is also written/updated in the output dir.

Options:

• --layers regex,natasha,llm — override which detection layers run (default from config). Use --layers regex for a fully offline, deterministic pass (no models/network).
• --out DIR — write outputs to DIR instead of next to each input.
• --dry-run — compute and print stats only; write no files.
• --no-map — disable the reversible map; emit non-unique [TYPE] placeholders, no map.json.

Already-emitted *.green.md / *.stats.json / *.map.json are skipped, so a folder can be re-run safely.

After running

1. Report the counts summary (types, layers, redaction rate) — never paste PII.
2. Tell the user the GREEN copy still needs human review before sharing.
3. Remind them the <name>.map.json is the secret (originals) — it stays local, never committed/shipped — and that confide:rehydrate uses it to restore real values into a cloud analysis of the GREEN text.
4. Offer confide:red to probe what an attacker could still infer/link.

Setup

Layer availability (Natasha, local LLM via Ollama) and defaults come from config — run confide:setup first if Natasha/Ollama aren't installed. --layers regex always works offline.